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Abstract: We investigate why biologists fail to contribute to biological databases although almost all of them use these
databases for research. We find, using evolutionary game theory and computer simulations, that (a) the initial distribution
of contributors who are patient determines whether a culture of contribution will prevail or not (b) institutions (where
institution means “a significant practice, relationship, or organization in a society or culture”) that incentivize patience and
therefore limit free riding make contribution more likely and, (c) a stable institution, whether it incentivizes patience or
not, will increase contribution. As a result we suggest there is a trade-off between the benefits of changing institutions to
incentivize patience and the costs of the change itself. Moreover, even if it is possible to create institutions that incentivize
patience among scientists such institutions may nevertheless fail. We create a computer simulation of a population of
biologists based on our theory. These simulations suggest that institutions should focus more on rewards rather than
penalties to incentivize a culture of contribution. Our approach therefore provides a methodology for developing a
practical blueprint for organizing scientists to encourage cooperation and maximizing scientific output.

Keywords: Community annotation, Cooperation, Biocuration.
INTRODUCTION
Science is a cooperative process. Cooperation, is an
action which incurs a cost c to the individual that performs it,
and provides a benefit b to the recipient of that action [1].
Researchers build off the work of others. Thus, if researchers
do not have access to the work of others, scientific progress
slows. Such access is possible if, for example, biologists
were to contribute annotations to public databases. This
process of contributing annotations is also known as
community annotation. Researchers can then access the
databases and use annotations contributed by others. Thus,
the level of contributions capture how much biologists are
willing to cooperate with each other without any expectation
of co-authorship. Of course each biologist reaps private
benefits from using these databases. The question then is do
biologists actually cooperate by contributing to these
databases? Unfortunately, they do not [2].

intensively [2]. Fewer than 1% of all possible contributors
actually contribute [16]. Scientists have hypothesized that
community annotation has not been successful because of
technical barriers [17]. However, several databases provide
simple mechanisms for contributing annotations. Thus, it
appears that the problem of non-contribution is social rather
than technological.

There have been several attempts to engage bench
scientists in contributing annotations to scientific databases.
Several articles describe the huge potential of such an
approach [3-15]. In fact, the scientific community hardly
ever contributes by providing annotations (such as
protein/gene function) to scientific databases even though
they use the biological data available in these databases quite

In the social sciences it is well known that patient people
(people who are willing to contribute or act today and
willing to wait to reap benefits later) cooperate while
impatient people do not [18]. This idea is so well known that
it is unclear who came up with it – hence its name, the folk
theorem [19]. The folk theorem states that any feasible
payoff profile that strictly dominates the minmax profile can
be realized as a Nash equilibrium payoff profile, with
sufficiently large discount factor. People with a high
discount factor value future payoffs more. That is, they are
willing to wait for the future. Thus, according to the folk
theorem, patient biologists, i.e. biologists with a high
discount factor,should cooperate by contributing to databases
[20]. Why don’t biologists cooperate by contributing to these
databases? The Folk theorem states that biologists (or
anybody for that matter) do not cooperate because they are
impatient. So more cooperation may be possible if biologists
are patient. How might patience evolve? We suggest a
theory.

*Address correspondence to this author at the Department of Economics,
Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA 24450, USA; Tel: 202-994-5004;
Fax: 202-994-8974; E-mail: BasuChoudharyA@vmi.edu

The Merriam Webster dictionary defines culture as “the
integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior
that depends upon the capacity for learning and transmitting
knowledge to succeeding generations.” Research in
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behavioral economics has established the psychological roots
of patience [21]. Thus, patience – or the lack thereof – is
ingrained in human behavior.Moreover, people differ in how
patient they are [22]. Since human behavior can be culturally
influenced and patience is part of human behavior, then it
seems likely that patience can be culturally influenced as
well [23]. Thus people can learn to be more or less patient
from others when patience levels vary. In other words, there
is diversity in the patient trait and a cultural transmission
process for it. The mathematics of natural selection ensures
that fitter cultural traits survive in the population while less
fit traits perish. This process leads to a stable selection of
traits. Thus an evolutionary game theory approach may help
us understand whether a culture of patience can be
evolutionarily stable in a population of biologists. In other
words, we apply the mathematical tools that explain
biological evolution to understand a process of cultural
evolution.
We use a theoretical model [24] and extend it. In this
model we assume that people in the patient culture cooperate
with others while people in the impatient culture do not.
Then, we hypothesize that a culture of patience is
“infectious” in a way that is amenable to analysis with
evolutionary game theory. This is a major departure from the
theoretical and empirical literature on patience [25-27].
Indeed, in spite of evidence to the contrary [22], experiments
that deal with the evolution of cooperation largely ignore the
variability of patience in a population [25, 26]. Our
innovation lies in proposing a model for the evolution of
patience as a cultural trait. Recall that the Folk Theorem
suggests that cooperation is possible if people are patient
enough. Thus by establishing a process for the evolution of
patience we can also address the evolution of cooperation.
This approach also provides a new kind of framework for
designing experiments with human subjects to test how
cooperation may evolve in a population.
Our fundamental argument is as follows. Patient people
tend to cooperate [18, 19]. People are heterogenous in patience
[21, 22]. We assume that this heterogeneity is cultural [23].
These cultures are subject to selection pressures from the
social environment and may therefore evolve [24]. The
conditions that allow patience to evolve toward a stable
equilibrium will also increase cooperation because of the folk
theorem. In this paper we derive a theory for how different
parameters influence the evolution of patience and therefore
cooperation. We then run computer simulations of a
population of agents, each programmed with different
frequencies of contribution. The agents are distributed
according to different probability distribution functions. These
programmed agents are then allowed to interact with each
other randomly. A generic replicator dynamic is applied to
these interactions. Since agents in the simulation are not
hardwired to follow the path directed in the model it is not
clear a priori whether the population will behave in a way
predicted by the model or not. We find that they do.
Our evolutionary approach suggests that even when the
benefits of patience (cooperation) are obvious there are
circumstances where impatience (and therefore noncooperation) can become a stable cultural norm – and
therefore explain why biologists do not cooperate with each
other by contributing annotations to databases. This study
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suggests ways to change the circumstances that make
cooperation less likely. Our computer simulation tests
whether cooperation can indeed become a cultural norm as
these circumstances change.
Contributing to molecular biology databases has no
immediate reward for the contributor, they have to wait for
others to contribute to take advantage of new information. In
fact, contributors may benefit only if others contribute as
well. Thus, there are clear benefits from cooperating by
contributing. This is certainly true for systems biology
research where information on a large number of proteins
from a proteome is necessary to develop any reasonable
testable hypothesis. Currently, the majority of experimental
data available in publications is not available in online
databases. For example, only 10% of available publications
on Bacillus subtilis(a well studied model organism) are cited
in UniProtKB/Swiss-Prot (www.uniprot.org). Using the
search term Bacillus subtilis [MeSH Terms] or "Bacillus
subtilis" at pubmed.org retrieves 20,000 – 25,000
publications. A UniProtKB/Swiss-Prot search of publications
(including mapped pubmed IDs from non-UniProt databases
such as Model Organism Databases) associated with Bacillus
subtilis (including all sub-species) retrieves 4,286 Swiss-Prot
entries with only 2,310 unique publications (UniProtKB
relase 2010_05). If one also considers supplementary tables,
it is clear that a large part of the knowledge available on
Bacillus subtilis is not accessible in a structured format that
would allow integrated analysis. This lack of information in
molecular biology databases when compared to what is
available in publications is true for all species and other
databases. This happens because it takes an immense amount
of time and effort to annotate a specific entry by a biocurator
[28, 29]. It is true that the workflow of biocurators at
UniProtKB does not include reading all papers or even citing
all the papers that they read unless the paper has relevant
information that can be curated, but it is clear that outside of
the paid biocurators’ efforts there is very little information in
UniProtKB annotations that has been submitted by the
community, even though the community uses it heavily and
there are easy to use submission forms on the website.
Further, as mentioned above, the biological community may
not be contributing because the benefits of such
contributions in terms of hypothesis generation and research
are uncertain. Moreover, the benefits may accrue to
researchers other than the contributor. In addition, these
benefits, given the lag time for research, may accrue well in
the future. The social interaction among biologists thus has
two connected elements. First, biologists can use the
contributions of others in their own research without
contributing to the databases – free rideoff the work of others
in the parlance of the social sciences. Second, biologists
have an incentive to get an immediate gain– getting
publications in time for tenure decisions or writing a grant
application to pay current salary for example – rather than
wait to get benefits from longer term projects.In other words,
impatient biologists would not contribute to databases while
patient biologists will.
We model a society with two cultures, patient and
impatient. Biologists “inherit” or choose to join one or the
other culture. Biologists in either culture interact in repeated
random pairings [30]. We then find the evolutionary stable
strategies (ESS), i.e. the strategy or culture that, if adopted
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Table 1. The Evolutionary Stage Game
Patient (r L)

Impatient (rH)

Patient (r L)

Impatient (rH)

by all members of a society, cannot be “invaded” by any
alternative cultures [31]. Thus, we find the conditions under
which impatience or patience can be stable cultures. We
recognize that there may be many patterns of interactions –
and simulate some of those in our computer model.
However, our modeling approach, where random pairings
lead to the transmission of cultural phenotypes, is simplest.
We also recognize that patience heterogeneity need not be
binary. However, assuming binary traits makes the
mathematics much simpler without losing any of the
fundamental features that we wish to focus on.

stylized model only benefit if others contribute as well while
non-contributors can free ride off the contributions of others.

Institutions (where institution means “a significant
practice, relationship, or organization in a society or
culture”) that incentivize patience should be critical in
making contribution to the dominant culture in biology.
Further, the perceived longevity of an institutional
mechanism should matter as well. Our theoretical model
characterizes these sorts of dynamics. We find that our
results are robust to a less restrictive distribution of
contributory behaviors when we simulate this society of
biologists in a computer generated “realistic” environment.
Thus, we suggest that our methodological approach could
provide the policy framework for funding agencies and
academic institutions to organize scientific effort optimally.

that may arise. In addition,
tracks the proportion of
the efficient outcome e appropriated by biologists in the noncontributing culture. Thus α tracks the extent to which the
non-contributing or impatient culture encourages “free
riding” off the contributions of others. Social institutions
reflect culture. Thus, α is a way of capturing the effect of
social institutions on the incentive to free ride. Please note
that we explicitly limit the range for α so as to limit the
strategic interaction investigated in this paper to an assurance

METHODS
Evolutionary games study the evolution of strategies or
behaviors in a population. Players receive payoffs that are
interpreted as the “fitness” of their respective cultures
(patience vs. impatience). Thus effectively cultures or
strategies interact with each other and not players. In other
words, in evolutionary game theory, strategies, and not
players, are subject to selection pressures. The fitter culture’s
proportion increases in a population.
We use the general version of the models introduced by
Basuchoudhary, Allen and Siemers [24]. We model
biologists as belonging to one of two possible cultures. In
one culture biologists contribute to a database because they
are willing to wait for greater future benefits. In the other
culture biologists do not contribute because they seek
immediate rewards. Biologists who contribute to the
database are patient relative to biologists who do not
contribute. Thus, patience is the source of cultural
heterogeneity in our model. This binary cultural trait is
represented by the discount rate r. The discount rate is an
interest rate used to calculate the present value of future
gains. Impatient people discount future gains more heavily
than patient people. Thus, biologists in a patient culture have
a lower discount rate (rL) than biologists in the impatient
high discount rate (rH) culture. This sort of social interaction
has the structure of a coordination game. Contributors in our

In our model fitness depends on certain parameters. The
total fitness when biologists from the contributing or patient
culture interact, e, defines the efficient outcome for the
society of biologists as a whole. Therefore e represents a
“good” outcome with long term scientific innovation. We
assume that biologists receive the full benefit of their
cooperation in contributing to the database. This assumption
allows us to abstract away from principal-agent problems

game. For example, for any
the game structure
changes to a prisoners dilemma. We, however, believe that a
contributary culture of biologists’ is best specified by
since there are increasing returns to contributions
when everyone coordinates on contributing to a database
[32].
In addition to these parameters we add p – the probability
the game continues. Again, recall that the standard definition
of institutions includes the rules of the game. Thus p tracks
the level of uncertainty in the institutional environment of
research. Thus, a falling p might indicate an increased
likelihood of an end to the current scientific funding regime;
i.e. an increased likelihood of institutional change. For
example, say National Science Foundation (NSF) funding is
driven by a purely democratic process with no input from
scientists.This process may change the kinds of projects that
are funded.We assume that p is independent of history.
The parameters described above, α, rH, rL, e, and p give
us the stage game described in Table 1. The table represents
the fitness of each strategy relative to each other [33, 34].
We assume that pairs of biologists from the patient and
impatient cultures interact with each other for long periods
of time. A cultural replicator dynamic process transmits
behavior from biologist to biologist. We do not explicitly
model this transmission process. However, mimicry is
sufficient for evolutionary models to work [35]. This
modeling approach simplifies the mathematics and is quite
standard in evolutionary game theory [36]. If biologists from
the patient culture interact the fitness of the patient cultureis
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e/2in each period. However, over time the present value of
this interaction is
. Notice that appropriate discount
factor is rL since we are calculating the fitness of the patient
culture. If one biologist is from a patient culture and another
biologist is from an impatient culture then the patient
biologist receives a fitness of 0 while the impatient biologist
gets a fitness of αe. In other words, the patient biologist does
not reap the rewards of her contribution while the impatient
biologist benefits from the patient biologists’ contribution.
The present value of this interation is 0 for the patient
biologist and
for the impatient biologist. Notice
that the appropriate discount factor is rH since we are
calculating the fitness of the impatient culture. If both
biologists are from the impatient culture then neither
contribute. Therefore, in this case both impatient biologists
receive a fraction α/2 of the efficient output of science e.
Thus the present value of the fitness of the impatient culture
when it interacts with another impatient culture is
.

patience, the extent to which institutional structures
incentivize free riding, the probability that these institutional
structures persist, and the initial proportion of contributors
in a population of biologists determine whether a culture of
contribution will prevail or not].
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The expected payoff from the Patient (rL) strategy is
(1)
and from Impatient (rH) strategy is
.

(2)

The patient and impatient strategy provide the same
expected payoff when E( rL ) = E( rH ), i.e.,

or

Note that for any α that takes a value between 0 and 1/2
the highest possible fitness arises when people from a patient
(cooperative and therefore contributing) culture interact with
other people from the patient culture. However, only a
proportion x of the population has a culture of patience.
Thus, there is a chance (1-x) that patient biologists may
interact with impatient (non-cooperative and therefore noncontributing) biologists. Note further that the parameter
restrictions on α suggest that the overall fitness of a world
where impatience (and therefore non-cooperation and noncontribution) prevails is less than the overall fitness of a
world where patience (and therefore cooperation and
contribution) is the norm. This, perhaps, should not be
surprising to the reader. However, overall, if a particular
culture has an expected payoff above the average fitness of
the entire population then the percentage of biologists
belonging to that culture will increase. And of course,
overall, if a particular culture has an expected fitness below
the average fitness of the entire population then the
percentage of biologists belonging to that culture will
decrease. In other words, the mathematics of replicator
dynamics drive the evolution of culture in our model.
We use a replicator dynamic approach to solve for the
ESS. An ESS is stable in the sense that small changes, i.e.
small proportions of a population playing the non-ESS
strategy, cannot invade a population successfully. This is a
static concept. A replicator dynamic approach suggests that an
ESS is stable precisely because it arises out of the dynamics of
a process that generates the fittest strategy [31]. We find that
the success of a culture of patience depends on whether the
actual proportion of the biologist population belonging to the
patient culture exceeds some critical level x*.
This approach allows us to derive three propositions. The
propositions and the derivations follow. We discuss these
propositions in the Discussion section.
Proposition 1. [There are no stable equilibria where both
cultures coexist.
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is a tipping point. Thus,

or

(3)
Define δL = p/(1 +

rL ) and δH = p/(1 + rH). Thus,
(4)

and,

(5)
Substituting (4) and (5) into (3) gives us

or,

(6)
Thus for the patient strategy to be preferred over the
impatient strategy

(7)
Proposition 2. [The likelihood that the culture of noncontribution will spread through the population of biologists
increases with the extent to which institutional structures
incentivize free riding].
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Notice in equation (6) that as α rises the denominator of
x* becomes smaller. Thus, as α rises so does x*.
Proposition 3. [An increase in the likelihood that the
current institutional structure will continue makes it easier
for a culture of contribution to take root since

].

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proposition 3 states that x* is decreasing in p. To
demonstrate this, we must show that the derivatives of x*
with respect to rH and p are always negative. Recall from (7)
that after substituting δH and δL,

We take the term
from the denominator and take
the first derivative with respect to p to find that
Notice,
by definition. Also,

> 0. Thus,

>0 In other words, the denominator of x* rises
with p. Thus x* itself falls as p rises.
This concludes the proofs for our propositions.
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 above, show how changes in the
parameters that affect the fitness of cultures in a population
of biologists affect the likelihood of a culture of contribution
taking root. In fact, α, p, and rH– the variables of interest in
those three propositions – affect the rewards and penalties
from pursuing a culture of contribution (the patient culture)
relative to the rewards and penalties from pursuing a culture
of non-contribution (the impatient culture). However, this
process may take a long time. Thus, finding evidence for this
process requires us to follow large groups of people for long
periods of time or design expensive experiments with human
subjects. Therefore, as an initial attempt to check whether
our results are robust, we use a computer model to simulate a
society of biologists in order to both test the robustness of
our mathematical results as well as get a sense of the
sensitivity of our predictions to changes in the rewards and
penalties of contributing. In this simulation, we specify a
replicator dynamic process based on various distributions of
several species or cultures of biologists. The frequency of
contribution is the source of heterogeneity among cultures in
our simulation. Thus, our computer simulations do not
“hardwire” patience in any way. We prefer instead to see if
the predictions of our theoretical model are borne out when
the level of contribution is the only choice made by
“biologists” in our simulation. We do this to avoid the
possibility of a simulation that gets our results because our
results are already pre-programmed in the simulation.
However, as biologists with different levels of contribution

interact, the order of the fitness of these interactions follows
the payoff structure in Table 1. We therefore suggest that if
biologists in the simulation behave predictably like
biologists in our theoretical model then the simulation
provides evidence in favor of our theory.
Our computer models simulate population dynamics to
test our results. To perform these population dynamics
simulations we have adopted a basic Metropolis technique to
devise an efficient Monte-Carlo scheme for a sampling
controlled by a generic continuous replicator dynamics
equation
. Here i is the index of
the sub species of the population and fi denotes the fitness of
the ithsub species while
is the average fitness of
the population. This method, therefore, first constructs a
population with m members by randomly assigning
frequency of contributions cm from a given distribution. In
reality, and unlike our theoretical model, people will not be
either contributors or non-contributors. They are more likely
to contribute along a spectrum of frequencies. Thus, some
members of our simulated population contribute more
frequently. These members of the simulated population are
distributed according to a probability distribution. We report
the results from two initial distributions, a uniform
distribution, and a normal distribution. These distributions
represent assumptions about how often biologists contribute
(see Fig. 1). The broad results reported below are robust to
the choice of distribution.
The method then attempts Monte-Carlo procedure of
creation, deletion, and mutation (displacement) during large
number of generations. One of two methods subsequently
determines the randomized probability of acceptance for a
certain operation: species derivative by replicator dynamics
(8)
and normalized cumulative distribution function of the mean
centered payoff,

(9)
It is important to note that both equations yield the same
equilibrium for binary systems, but the second equation
allows for ESS distributions with more than two multiple
quasi-species concurrently existing.
Analytical evaluation of continuous mode replicator
dynamics leads to the following equation

(10)
where CC, CD, DC, DD are the coefficients in payoff matrix
(for the simulations we started from CC=3, CD/DC=0/2,
DD=1). M is the total momentum of frequency distribution
function
(11)
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Fig. (1). Series of expression profilefrequency
snapshots
taken during population dynamics simulations for normal (top diagrams) and uniform (bottom
diagrams) distributions. Abscissa (x-axis) shows the frequency of contribution by a subspecies and ordinate (y-axis) show the scaled
probability of finding a member with such characteristics. Both panels show that starting from non-biased normal (extreme top left panel
figure) or uniform (extreme bottom left panel figure) distributions result in completely non-contributing populations. Top panel shows that a
population that has a preferred culture of non-contribution converges quicker to a total non-contributing population while the bottom panel
(without any preferred culture of contribution) shows a much more gradual defection (twice as long) to non-cooperation.

We performed multiple simulations to analyze
implications of different strategies applied towards
population. These simulations included variations with and
without members changing strategies over multiple
generations. Members changed in continuous distribution
modes and optimized their contributing frequency during
displacement operations. To model birth, maturation and
death of a trait (contributing culture vs. non-contributing) the
frequency, the step of displacement, and the deletion events
were correlated with the age of the trait (how long the trait
has been in place).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We propose that differences in the level of patience in a
population, as defined above, is a key factor in determining
whether a culture of contribution will evolve, or not.
Whether people are patient or not may depend on the
institutional rules that govern collaboration relative to
individual effort. Thus, institutions that incentivize
individual effort play a large role in determining whether
biologists contribute to community annotations – mainly by
affecting the patience of biologists. Our methodology
generates three propositions. We then use computer
simulations to test these propositions for robustness and
validity. We state and discuss our results below.
First of all, we note that the replicator dynamic approach
to solving this game allows us to find evolutionary stable
strategies. We find that the impatient culture is an
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) if
and
around

where

. This implies that small changes
will shift the equilibrium towards a

culture where either contribution prevails or noncontributionprevails. Thus even if, for example, a small ε
proportion of the patient population changes and becomes
impatient the culture of the entire population cascades
towards the point where only a culture of impatience
prevails. The opposite happens if a small ε proportion of the
population mutates and becomes patient. This proposition
therefore suggests that the patient culture can prevail only if
the proportion x of patient people in a population satisfies x
> x*. Since there is no a priori reason to believe that x will
always exceed x* , we cannot predict that the culture of
patience will succeed. For example if x* is 8% while the
actual proportion of patient biologists in a population is 7.9%
then this society of biologists will be doomed to be plagued
by non-contribution. But all will be well if the actual
proportion of patient biologists happens to be 8.1%. In the
context of this paper, this result suggests that a culture that
incentivizes non-contribution may well become the dominant
culture among biologists even though it is clearly not
optimal for the system. Proposition 1 therefore suggests that
the populations of biologists will either converge on an
equilibrium where everyone is a contributor or where
everyone (almost everyone) is a non-contributor because
there is no evolutionarily stable equilibrium where both
types can coexist. Realistically, both cultures may coexist at
any point in time. However, as a dynamic matter one culture
will die out. In addition, whether the system reaches the
equilibrium where everyone is either a contributor or a noncontributor depends on the initial distribution of contributors
relative to non-contributors.
In our computer simulations, biologists have uniform or
normally distributed frequencies of contribution. A normal
distribution mimics a system where some cultures are more
common than others are and around some average frequency
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of contribution. A uniform distribution mimics a system
where none of the culture is over or underrepresented. Fig.
(1) is a representative graph of the replicator dynamic
process. We further note here that the biologists in our
computer simulation differ only in the frequency of
contribution. Recall that we do not explicitly program
differences in patience in these simulated biologists. Thus,
the results are not an artifact of the simulation program.
However, the fitness of the biologist cultures as they interact
with each other follows the rank ordering suggested by our
theory. Thus, changes in the distribution of biologists in the
simulation that matches our theoretical predictions may be
evidence in favor of our patience-based theory.
First, we note from Fig. (1) that the simulated population
of biologists moves towards an equilibrium with only one
culture. This result is sensitive to the choice of initial
parameters – the mean of the distribution of the frequency of
contribution in the case of the normal distribution or the
number of members in each culture in the case of the
uniform distribution. This provides evidence in support of
our claim that even when the benefits of cooperation by
increasing contributions are clear, whether actual
cooperation happens or not critically depends on the initial
mass of contributors. Thus, formal policies that incentivize
contributions (short of actual coercion) might fail if the
numbers of biologists who cooperate frequently are not high
enough to begin with. We also find that the choice of the
normal distribution results in much quicker collapse of the
system into one of the extremes relative to the uniform
distribution (Fig. 2). Thus, one may conclude that
populations with one predominant culture or frequency of
contribution are more difficult to sway towards one direction
than populations where no culture is predominant. This has
important implications for policy implementation. Whether a
policy will potentially increase contribution or not depends
on the distribution of cooperative biologists in the
population.
Of course, rH, rL, α and p determine x*. This suggests that
the ESS are sensitive to changes in patience, the extent to
which institutional structures incentivize free riding, and the
probability that these institutional structures persist. We
therefore ask the following question -- how does x* respond
to changes in some of the parameters in our model? Recall
that x* represents a sort of tipping point for whether one
culture will prevail over the other or not. Thus if x* rises
then for the patient culture to succeed a larger proportion of
the population needs to be patient. Changes to the actual
proportion of a population would be rare and small. We
therefore suggest that a rising x* makes it harder for the
patient culture to succeed. With this outcome in mind we
state and discuss our results from propositions 2 and 3 to
show how x* responds to changes in α and p.
Proposition 2 follows from the proof that
.
Clearly the formula for the tipping point in Proposition 1
indicates that as α rises so does x*. This happens because as
the incentive to be impatient grows, so does the need for
more patient people in society to achieve the efficient
outcome. In other words, a rising x* implies that a higher
proportion of the population needs to be part of a patient
culture for a patient culture to prevail. This makes it harder
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for the patient culture to prevail. For example, say 10% of a
society is patient. Further, assume that x* is 8%. According
to Proposition 1 a patient culture will prevail in this society.
Now say that an institutional change incentivizes impatience,
e.g., a fall in the contributing standards required by the NSF
or National institutes of Health (NIH) makes α rise. As a
result say x* rises to 12%. Now suddenly our society, where
the proportion of patient biologists is at 10%, finds itself on
the wrong side of x* and begins to move towards the
impatient equilibrium. In this scenario more and more
biologists succumb to non-contribution at the expense of
those who do not – effectively crowding out patient
biologists. Thus, designing institutional mechanisms to
induce biologists to wait are important.
Proposition 3 basically states that as p falls the present
value of future payoffs to both cultures diminish. However,
the payoff to the impatient culture falls relatively less than
that for the patient culture since the impatient culture places
less value on the future anyway. Thus as p falls the impatient
culture becomes fitter (has a relatively higher payoff) than
the patient culture. This leads to an increase in the proportion
of impatient biologists in the population. Thus, as p falls,
more patient biologists are needed for the patient culture to
prevail.
We interpret p as the probability that a particular
institution continues. Thus any change in the rules of the
game -- signifying an end to the game itself -- indicates the
end of an institution. This proposition then essentially means
that if any institutional arrangement becomes more likely to
change then it becomes harder for the patient culture to
prevail. Say the government is contemplating a change in the
regulatory structure that will reduce free riding –as suggested
in Proposition 2 above. Then, paradoxically, even if the
purpose of the regulation is to reduce non-contribution and
improve efficiency its effect will be to make it harder for
biologist’s incentives to be patient contributors. This
strengthens cultural path dependency – for good or for bad.
Moreover, Propositions 2 and 3, taken together suggests that
there is a trade off between the expected benefits of any
attempt to change the institutional incentive to free ride and
the act of the change itself. This sort of trade-off deserves
further attention in future research.
Propositions 2 and 3 above show how changes in the
parameters that affect the fitness of cultures in a population
of biologists affect the likelihood of a culture of contribution
taking root. In fact, α, and p– the variables of interest in
those propositions – affect the rewards and penalties from
pursuing a culture of contribution (the patient culture)
relative to the rewards and penalties from pursuing a culture
of non-contribution (the impatient culture). For example,
notice from Table 1 that, an increase in α rewards an
impatient person when she interacts with a patient person.
On the other hand, an increase in p penalizes an impatient
person when she interacts with a patient person.
It is clear from equation (10) that the weighted
momentum of the distribution plays an important role in the
stability of species. Increases in the payoff and penalty ratios
essentially shift the momentum of c(x) thus changing the
behavior of the population. This particular treatment of the
population of biologists in our simulated environment
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Fig. (2). The speed by which the population collapses into one of the critical states depends on initial and new member generation
distributions. The positive values of the speed signify the convergence to all contributing population and negative values demonstrate the
collapse to all defecting population. The actual shape of the saddle depends not only on the means of the distributions but also on standard
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captures the effects of Propositions 2 and 3 above – all of
which show the impact of changes in the benefits of
defection (and therefore the penalties from not contributing)
relative to cooperation. Thus, a decrease in α or an increase
in p will increase the benefit of cooperation relative to the
net benefit from defection.
We find, based on reasonable assumptions about initial
conditions and fitness (Fig. 3), that an increase in the
benefits of contribution, through some reward mechanism,

for example, are more likely to lead to equilibriums where
the culture of contribution predominates. We find this result
is more likely when benefits from contribution rise rather
than when penalties from not contributing (through a
decrease in the fitness of defection) are increased (Fig. 3 and
4). Our theoretical model predicts that a decrease in α or an
increase in p, i.e., an increase the benefit of cooperation
relative to the net benefit from defection; all make it easier
for a culture of patience to take root. Further, given a
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growing culture of patience, people should cooperate more
by contributing more. Our simulation directly links an
increase in the benefit of cooperation relative to the net
benefit from defection to an increase in the number of
biologists who contribute more. While we do not program
patience in biologists in our simulation, we do order the
fitness of the culture they belong to according to our
patience-based theory (Table 1). This suggests that our
theoretical pathway linking α and p to increased
contributions by biologists because of their increased desire
to cooperate operates through patience. This result is robust
to many different specifications for initial conditions and
parameters. Moreover, from a policy standpoint this result
suggests that funding agencies should reward contributors
rather than penalize non-contributors to establish a culture of
patience and contribution.
Our theory and simulations suggest that there are no
guarantees that a culture of contribution will prevail in a
society of biologists – even with the “right” sort of
institutions. However, the likelihood that a contributory
culture will prevail is enhanced if there is an increase in the
rewards from contribution relative to the penalty from not
contributing. In particular we point toward the three
lynchpins of any policy to make a culture of contribution the
predomninant culture in this society – the stability of rules,
the patience of individuals and the rewards from contributing
relative to not contributing.
Our model and simulations have implications for
experimental design as well. In cooperation experiments
with human subjects patience is usually modeled using
experiment termination rules [25]. In these experiments,
games have some probability of ending. Mathematically, of
course, the probability a game continues is equivalent to a
discount rate. Thus, using game termination rules to model
discount rates may be mathematically justified. Further,
presumably, if the subjects know that a game is very likely to
end they will behave more impatiently than if they knew that
the game is more likely to continue. But this psychological
justification is muddy at best. If people come into the
experiment with a culturally predetermined patience level
then it is unclear what sort of behavior is being captured in
an experiment where the patience level is forced on the

subject as a part of the experimental treatment. Thus, if one
accepts that patience is culturally determined, as appears to
be the broad consensus among behavioral economists and
psychologists [18, 21], then experiments that force specific
patience levels on subjects may be capturing behavior whose
interpretation is at best unclear [27]. We have developed a
framework that allows patience and cooperation to co-evolve
in an experimental setting. When patience is not allowed to
evolve by experimental design neither can cooperation. This
may be why cooperation is so hard to replicate in the lab[25,
26]. Thus, for example, in order to get human subjects to
cooperate in experimental settings all subjects should be
faced with the same experiment termination rules. Further,
some sort of mechanism could sort subjects according to
their patience levels prior to the experiment. Now one could
test if patience evolves in settings where our theory and
simulations suggests it should. If patience evolves so should
cooperation according to the Folk Theorem. After all biology
and human life is replete with examples of cooperation [37]!
Our theory provides the levers to engineer this cooperation
in the lab and, if experimentally justified, in the real world.
CONCLUSION
Our theory and simulations suggest the there are no
guarantees that a culture of contribution will prevail in a
society of biologists – even with the “right” sort of
institutions. However, a culture of contribution is more likely
if contributors are rewarded rather than by punishing noncontributors. This can be done by manipulating the stability
of rules, the patience of individuals, and the rewards from
contributing relative to not contributing. Thus our theory
suggests several testable hypotheses and is a first attempt at
developing a systematic methodology for organizing
scientiststo maximize scientific cooperation.
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